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NIO/Africa
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SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICAI. Introduction

The one common perception that policymakers, intelligence analysts, legislators, and informed American public opinion can all agree on is that South Africa is of importance to the United States. There are widely differing views among observers as to the principal nature of this importance, as to how events are likely to unfold over the next several years in South Africa, and as to what policies the United States should pursue to protect and advance its interests in this important part of Africa. I propose to share with you the appreciation of the strategic importance of South Africa as seen by our principal antagonist, the Soviet Union, and what they are doing to advance their interests. The Intelligence Community has been seized with the question of how events are likely to unfold over the next several years in South Africa, and I will give you the Community's estimate of the most likely course of events over the next four years and beyond. I will give you our appreciation of who the major actors are competing for power, finishing with a look at the African National Congress and its prospects over the next two years.

Today - discuss larger strategic perspective on Southern Africa esp. from S. Africa's point of view. ANC, the smaller, vulnerable S. Africa's neighbors.

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IV. The Intelligence Community Assessment

While a period of dramatic political change has begun in South Africa, the Intelligence Community believes that the white minority government, relying primarily on the coercive actions of its security forces, will remain in power for some time. Over the next four years, it ~~is judged~~ *we judge* that Pretoria's political, economic, and military resources are sufficient to avert a collapse of the white regime. However, the black townships will remain tinderboxes of dissent and antigovernment sentiment, which combined with increasing socioeconomic pressures will result in a continuing pattern of violence. While there is no agreed Community view beyond four years, CIA analysts believe that by the year 2000 the transition to majority rule will be well underway, if not complete.

~~The Community~~ *We* believe that Pretoria's program of incremental and closely controlled reform from above is unlikely to register marked success in either coopting large numbers of blacks or significantly reducing violence. Reasons for this include:

- Botha's insistence on incremental change and seeking the concurrence of the majority of Afrikaner people, thus guaranteeing a slow pace of reform.

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- The stigma of "collaboration" attached to any black opinion leader participating in limited power-sharing on government terms has increased, and the Botha government is unlikely to find many serious black leaders to cooperate with his reform efforts. Polarization and radicalization of moderate or apolitical blacks will continue to increase.
- The economy--which will suffer in part from the effects of sanctions and diminished investor confidence--is unlikely to grow beyond 3 per cent a year, a rate which cannot support comprehensive new government programs for black services and which will not cope with the growing black unemployed rate.

At the same time, ^{we} ~~the Community does~~ not believe the onset of widespread violence since 1984 heralds a convulsive, violent revolution any time soon. Reasons for this include:

- The pervasive police/security coercive power of the regime, reflected most recently in the firm declaration of a national State of Emergency which appears capable of suppressing major outbreaks of violence and opposition activity.
- The continuing lack of organizational unity among black protesters. Ideological disputes, tribal splits, a wide

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generation gap, urban-rural divisions, and government divide and rule tactics all are potent factors which will inhibit the ability of these groups to challenge the government.

- The still limited capability of the ANC to conduct paramilitary warfare or orchestrate political action within South Africa.

The most likely scenario ^{we} ~~the Intelligence Community~~ sees over the next several years is an increasingly isolated and beleaguered South Africa, but with a determined and ruthless white regime aggressively wielding its police powers ^{and} ~~which will~~ doggedly pursuing ^{ing} its own incremental policy of reform despite its broad nonacceptance. ^{we} ~~It is~~ recognized that a dramatic change in the government's attitude toward reform, an unexpected collapse of white resolve, or a major expansion in the ^{nature} ~~and~~ level of black unrest ^{-- ~~expansion~~ most likely sparked by a dramatic event such as Mandela's death or other dramatic development --} could change this estimate.

V. The Contenders for Power

The three most conspicuous trends discernable within South Africa have been:

- A broadening of white recognition that classic apartheid is a failed political blueprint and the search for a new political structure preserving white privilege and power.

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- The emergence of new and strengthening of established black political organization.
- The politicization and growing radicalization of the black population.

These

~~These~~ trends define the major political actors on the South African scene.

The South African Government and the Nationalist Party have been seized with the need of reforming the sociopolitical structure as has much of the white electorate. The leadership of the party and government has been unable to come forward with a clear vision of a new political system, due, we believe, to its unwillingness to abandon either white socioeconomic privilege or ultimate white control of the national government--again, reflecting the views of two-thirds or more of the white electorate. P. W. Botha himself is likely to leave the political scene by 1989 if not sooner, but his most likely successor, F. W. deKlerk, shares the same fundamentally limited agenda as Botha. While opposition from the white radical right concerns the Nationalist leadership and will provoke policy adjustments regarding the scope and pace of reform, we do not see the likelihood of the right-wing opposition parties bringing down the Nationalist control of government over the next few years.

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The dual phenomena of black politicization and organization has resulted in an explosion of black organization⁵, with hundreds of issue-oriented and community groups emerging in the last few years. These groups have begun to aggregate themselves into nationwide organizations with nervous South African Government acquiescence. The two most dynamic aggregations of black organization are the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Two other significant aggregations which antedate the UDF and COSATU are the black power groups and the tribal homeland leaderships. The most visibly dynamic black grouping is the young "comrades" responsible for most of the township violence of the last year.

The UDF: The UDF is a loose federation of over 600 separate and widely disparate organizations with both national and regional leaderships and a claimed membership of some 2 million. The UDF's political platform closely resembles the ANC's Freedom Charter and many UDF leaders have had strong ANC connections. The ANC probably has substantial influence with the national UDF leadership, some of the regional leaderships such as the Natal and West Cape UDF organizations, and reportedly directs a small number of the component organizations. Nonetheless, we do not credit either South African Government or ANC claims that the UDF is an ANC surrogate. The UDF is a loose organization and the large majority of its component organizations are autonomous actors and not controlled by the ANC. Many of these groups are issue

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oriented and are willing to act contrary to ANC wishes in negotiating with the South African Government or "establishment" entities to obtain real reforms or benefits for their members. The UDF's future is cloudy. The organization has become more radicalized in recent months as newly formed community and youth groups, often dominated by violence-oriented radicals, claim allegiance to the UDF while more conservative, reform-oriented groups and leaders, including religious groups, have fallen silent due to lack of results from their efforts. The UDF appears a specific target of government suppression and, given the disparate nature of its constituency, it is questionable whether the UDF can survive concerted government suppression.

COSATU: The most dynamic and growing trade union group is the 660,000 member Congress of South African Trade Unions. A federation of some 33 unions, COSATU includes the pragmatic mainstream black unions and 17 more politically activist unions affiliated with the UDF. We expect the Congress to retain formal independence of all political groups. Various COSATU leaders have met with ANC representatives outside South Africa on at least two occasions and most Congress leaders recognize the ANC as the preeminent liberation group. Nevertheless, some union leaders believe that the ANC does not act in the interests of workers and oppose any contact. *Despite their concerns, we expect* ~~COSATU is likely to attract additional members from other, less dynamic federations such as TUCSA, AZACTU, and CUSA.~~ *The trend to become more radicalized, advocating* ~~within~~ *more* ~~COSATU and individual trade unions reflects a radicalization, with~~ *for political and not just* ~~political strikes and boycotts being advocated by some trade union~~

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~~leaders over~~ strictly economic issues. The detention of over 900 unionists during the present state of emergency now has moved COSATU and its member unions directly into political confrontation with Pretoria. The government can be expected to suppress union leaders with an excessively political agenda while tolerating occasional one-day political stayaways. On balance, we see a gradual rather than headlong radicalization of the black trade union movement.

Black Consciousness Groups: The National Forum is an attempt by various "black consciousness" groups to create a rival grouping to the UDF. Their ideological predecessor, the now-banned Black Consciousness Movement, provided the dynamic for the 1976 Soweto riots. Black consciousness groups believe blacks should win their own liberation, and reject white domination or participation in the struggle. The leading member group, the Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) which has about 20,000 members, criticizes both the ANC and UDF on a number of accounts, most vehemently by accusing the ANC of being controlled by white and Indian communists. Most National Forum groups are dominated by intellectuals, internally divided, and are increasingly in violent conflict with the UDF. Despite the fact that the National Forum group's ideology appears closer to the views of many township radicals than that of the ANC or UDF, we expect continuing defections from this group to the ANC and UDF.

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Tribal/Homeland Groups: The "homeland" governments have all organized tribally oriented political movements with government acquiescence or encouragement. We believe that tribal loyalties and rivalries are still prevalent, especially among the 14 million rural blacks, and thus susceptible to exploitation by these groups. The Zulu movement Inkatha, led by Chief Buthelezi, represents the most dynamic of these groups, with a claimed membership of over 1 million. These groups will come under increasing attack by activist opposition elements as "sellouts," spreading the factional violence now occurring in the urban townships into the homelands.

The Township Militants: The most visibly active grouping within South Africa are the mostly unemployed and young township militants--called "comrades"--who are responsible for much of the violence. The township militants appear to lack coherent organization or serious affiliation with other groups. In general, they favor violence against "collaborators," the "establishment," and feel that only by open violence can they bring down the system of white rule. Various groups claim allegiance to the ANC, UDF, or AZAPO but evidence of serious organization or incorporation is lacking. Violence often seems random and nihilistic. The ANC, UDF, and AZAPO are making efforts to recruit and control these groups but with only limited success to date. The very amorphousness of these groups prevents comprehensive government

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
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suppression of them. As economic conditions in the townships worsen and recruitment efforts on the part of the ANC, UDF, and AZAPO intensify, we envision some more structured organization of these elements developing, particularly in townships and parts of townships where the government has abandoned all attempts at control. The ANC has a marked advantage in recruiting these groups by means of its supply of arms and will likely make the most headway, but we envision much of the township violence continuing to come from ill-organized and largely transitory groupings. We also see interfactional violence between differing elements of these township militants on the rise as rival groups feud. This intracommunal violence will be at times encouraged by the South African Government. The reduction of influx control and the anticipated new waves of rural-to-urban immigrants will provide all factions with fresh manpower for more violence and feuding.

The latest South African Government declaration of a State of Emergency and the detention of over 2,000 opposition activists reflect Pretoria's growing perception that its limited reforms and relatively restrained use of state power neither produce international gains nor domestic tranquility. While the ANC and UDF appear to be the major targets of security action, COSATU and other groups have also had leaders detained. The UDF regional and national leaderships seem particularly vulnerable, but the South African Government will have considerable difficulty in attempts to repress black trade unions beyond the short term. We believe that the security crackdown will continue for some

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Question: IS THE ANC A TERRORIST GROUP?

Although the ANC remains in a distinctly different category than European groups such as the Red Brigade or Lebanese terrorist groups, its military wing recently has conducted more indiscriminate attacks than in the past with mounting white casualties in particular. Until last year, the ANC generally tried to avoid injuring civilians during its bombing attacks on government targets. Exceptions usually were unintentional or were justified as retaliation for South African raids against ANC targets in neighboring states. Following a major conference last summer, the ANC said it would continue to strike at government targets but would be less concerned about civilian casualties. Most ANC bombings since late last year, however, have been directed against civilian targets--shopping malls, bus stops, restaurants, and isolated farms. ANC leaders may have decided that attacks on government targets alone are not sufficient against a backdrop of the worst domestic unrest in South Africa's modern history. Alternatively, but less likely in our view, the new trend may only reflect independent acts by renegade ANC guerrillas inside the country.

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Question: IS MANDELA A COMMUNIST?

Mandela almost certainly is not a Communist, although he worked closely and formed strong friendships with many SACP members before his imprisonment in 1962. During the mid-1940s, both Mandela and Oliver Tambo were virulently anti-Communist, and even created the ANC Youth League in part as a base to work toward driving Communists out of the parent body. Mandela's view apparently changed over time as he began to appreciate the vigorous antiapartheid efforts of many Communists. He has maintained consistently that he is not a Communist and was acquitted on that charge in a South African court. During his trial in the early 1960s, he stated that ultimately, Communists and black nationalists such as himself would find themselves on divergent paths when a black government comes to power, but could work together until then against a common enemy.

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Question: WHAT WOULD MANDELA DO IF HE WERE FREE?

We think it unlikely that South African government will release Mandela with the intention of negotiating with him on the country's political future. Pretoria, however, might release Mandela into exile, if only to prevent his death in prison. Mandela probably would then resume a leadership role in the ANC and be a highly visible ambassador for the group internationally.

To release Mandela within the country would be viewed as very risky by the South African government because of his immense popularity among blacks. A general strike personally called by Mandela probably would draw an unprecedented response. Because he is strong-willed, however, Mandela--if allowed to remain inside the country--might confront the government immediately upon his release in a provocative manner (he has told journalists that if freed, he would expect to be back in jail within 24 hours). Scenarios in which Mandela travels around South Africa Gandhi-style and marshals black support for a powersharing arrangement with the white government ignore, in our view, Mandela's militant, activist background and Pretoria's record of intolerant behavior toward threats to continued white control of the country.

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